The Imperative of Timely Action: Bridging Divides and Safeguarding TIRA

By: Yemane Halefom

October 29, 2024

Abstract

Governance in postwar transitions is inherently fragile, particularly when competing factions— some now operating as political fugitives—aim to derail reforms and destabilize emergent governance systems. Tigray’s predicament is both unique and complex. As a small region within Ethiopia, Tigray finds itself at a crossroads after enduring a genocidal war orchestrated by the Federal government in collaboration with the Eritrean regime and foreign powers, including the UAE. Unfortunately, Tigray continues to face active adversaries, both internal and external. This article, however, focuses exclusively on Tigray’s internal challenges, specifically the dysfunction within the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA). While reform efforts may appear overdue, this article underscores the importance of timely and decisive action by TIRA, emphasizing that even late intervention is preferable to inaction.

The article identifies two interconnected challenges: (1) bridging the divide between TIRA’s governance efforts and the aspirations of the Tigray people, and (2) countering the mutating tactics of the illegal TPLF faction to destabilize governance. To address these problems and secure a stable and inclusive future, TIRA must implement leadership appointments and promote free local elections grounded in merit and public trust while dismantling extractive power structures that obstruct reform and progress. Delays in reform only exacerbate the risks, creating governance vacuums that empower factions to prolong cycles of instability. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of vigilance, strategic leadership, and timely action in safeguarding the future of Tigray.

I. Introduction

The Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA), formed under the Pretoria Agreement and federal law, is mandated to govern Tigray through its transitional phase until national elections are held. However, TIRA faces two significant challenges: (1) aligning governance efforts with public expectations for security, peace, justice, and meaningful reform, and (2) neutralizing the illegal TPLF faction, which continues to metamorphose into an extralegal force, employing military allies, civic organizations, and advocacy networks to protect its kleptocratic power structures. These factions, acting under the guise of public advocates, exploit dissatisfaction to undermine TIRA’s authority and position themselves for a potential coup through public unrest.

Drawing on Acemoglu and Robinson’s institutional theory, alongside Platonic and Socratic philosophy, this paper argues that extractive institutions, which concentrate power within narrow oligarchic and kleptocratic circles, perpetuate inequality, instability, and paralysis. Inclusive governance, on the other hand, distributes power more equitably, fostering participation, public trust, and sustainable transformation (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). TIRA must align itself with these principles of inclusiveness to avoid reproducing exclusionary dynamics that destabilize governance. This is also consistent with the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement and shall be done without delay.

In Tigray’s context, inaction is not a neutral stance; it invites disorder. As Socrates warned, “Evil arises not only from malicious intent but from the absence of action.” In Tigray’s volatile context, delayed governance allows factions to consolidate power and deepen instability. TIRA must act swiftly to address public demands while neutralizing factional threats through decisive governance, ensuring that leadership remains aligned with the common good.

A significant indicator of TIRA’s inaction is its inability to establish an Advisory Council, even long after gaining Cabinet approval. Such a body would act as the legislative branch of TIRA, providing oversight, shaping policy, and fostering inclusivity. Without this council, governance remains incomplete, leaving gaps in legitimacy and accountability that hinder TIRA’s progress. Understanding these governance challenges requires a deeper exploration of the theoretical foundations that inform power dynamics, reform efforts, and the role of institutions.

II. Theoretical Foundations: Governance, Power, Reform, and Institutional Dynamics

Acemoglu and Robinson’s institutional theory (2012), provides a valuable framework for understanding the governance challenges currently facing Tigray. They argue that extractive institutions, by concentrating power among oligarchs and kleptocrats, suppress political participation and stifle economic growth, creating vicious cycles of inequality and instability. The illegal TPLF faction exemplifies these dynamics by entrenching itself within civic institutions, aligning with military sympathizers, and leveraging a handful of rogue oligarchs to obstruct reforms and disrupt governance efforts.

Inclusive institutions, by contrast, distribute power more evenly, fostering broad participation and sustainable development. TIRA’s efforts to initiate reforms reflect an attempt to transition toward inclusiveness, but these efforts require timely intervention to break the grip of extractive institutions. If delayed, governance vacuums will persist, giving factions more room to consolidate their influence and destabilize the political landscape.

Plato’s warnings about factionalism remain relevant in Tigray: factions erode unity, disrupt the pursuit of the common good, and exploit governance weaknesses to pursue their interests. TIRA must respond to these challenges with pragmatic, well-timed decisions to prevent the faction from exploiting governance gaps and deepening uncertainty.

Zakaria (2024) argues that revolutionary change throughout history is often accompanied by backlash from entrenched power structures resisting progress. This dynamic—where progress encounters counter-movements aimed at maintaining the status quo—parallels the challenges TIRA faces as it works to neutralize extractive institutions and illegal factions obstructing governance reforms in Tigray. The struggle between reform and resistance in Tigray embodies broader historical patterns identified by Zakaria, where revolutionary momentum must be upheld to prevent reactionary forces from regaining influence.

An essential step toward fostering inclusive governance within TIRA is establishing an Advisory Council to function as its legislative branch. Such a council is crucial for policy oversight, accountability, and alignment with public aspirations, thereby contributing to institutional stability. Its absence perpetuates a governance vacuum, jeopardizing TIRA’s legitimacy and opening opportunities for factional resistance. This aligns with Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) emphasis on the role of inclusive institutions in promoting transparency, public trust, and sustainable governance, underscoring the importance of creating structures that anchor transitional administrations.
Tigray’s current situation exemplifies the real-world impact of Acemoglu and Robinson’s institutional theory and classical political thought. TPLF’s faction-dominated extractive institutions are designed to maintain power among a small group, suppressing participation and hindering progress.

III. Extractive Institutions and the TPLF’s Illegal Faction Mutating Tactics of Obstruction

The illegal TPLF faction exemplifies how extractive institutions actively resist reform to preserve power. Military interference at the TPLF’s Central Committee meeting, where generals reversed the demotion of Chairperson Dr. Debretsion Gebremichael and blocked deliberations on Vice- Chairperson Fetlewek Gebreziabher, reflects the faction’s and its allies’ determination to obstruct legitimate processes. This military interference in internal party matters demonstrates how extractive networks paralyze political processes and governance, preventing accountability and meaningful transformation.

Further, TIRA has sought to build public trust by holding public meetings across towns in Tigray, reflecting the broad demand for change. Public meetings held in Temben, Adigrat, Michew and Mekelle showcased wide public support for reform, good governance, and progress. However, these efforts have encountered resistance from the branches of the faction in some places. In Shire, military elements aligned with the illegal faction disrupted a public meeting, illustrating the faction’s reliance on coercion to maintain influence. The failure of Tigray’s security forces to ensure the President’s safety in Shire further exposed how extractive institutions perpetuate governance paralysis, obstructing TIRA’s transition toward inclusive governance through public dialogue.

The faction’s behind-the-scenes efforts through civic organizations and advocacy networks, disguised as reconciliation initiatives, reflect a deliberate attempt to manipulate public sentiment and obstruct meaningful reforms. Military commanders publicly providing advice and orders to pause reform efforts, and pledging loyalty to the illegal faction in public meetings, reveal the nepotism, patronage, and rent-seeking networks embedded in these extractive systems. All these conspiracies against TIRA undermine the rule of law and must be bridged through legal means before complete anarchy prevails in Tigray.

IV. Bridging the Governance Gap: Meeting Public Expectations

Building on the theoretical insights of inclusive governance and the detailed examination of the TPLF’s obstructive tactics, TIRA must take decisive and inclusive actions to bridge the governance gap and meet public expectations. This requires a multi-faceted strategy that prioritizes public trust, aligns reforms with the public good, and neutralizes factional resistance.

Ensuring Responsive and Transparent Governance
TIRA must strengthen its governance framework by implementing policies that prioritize transparency and public involvement. Drawing from Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) emphasis on inclusive institutions, TIRA should enhance communication channels that facilitate active public participation in decision-making. This will counteract the entrenched influence of extractive institutions and demonstrate a commitment to democratic values.

Leveraging Public Engagement to Counteract Factional Influence
The illegal TPLF faction’s manipulation of civic organizations and advocacy groups reveals the need for TIRA to establish robust, community-focused outreach initiatives. By increasing the frequency and depth of public consultations, TIRA can proactively address grievances and pre-empt attempts by factions to exploit public dissatisfaction. These measures will reinforce the idea that governance reforms are participatory and reflective of the population’s aspirations, countering the disruptive narratives propagated by obstructionist forces.

Maintaining Vigilance and Accountability
To meet public expectations and prevent governance vacuums, TIRA must institute stringent oversight mechanisms that ensure accountability and prevent extractive networks from regaining influence. This aligns with Plato’s insights on factionalism and power vacuums, emphasizing the importance of governance that remains vigilant against the ambitions of opposing forces. Continuous evaluation and adaptation of strategies will be essential to maintain alignment with the public’s expectations and address evolving challenges.

Building Institutional Trust through Decisive Action
Incorporating timely, well-executed reforms that focus on equitable power distribution will strengthen TIRA’s legitimacy and mitigate the influence of opposition factions. As Zakaria (2024) notes, sustaining revolutionary momentum is crucial to prevent the resurgence of entrenched power structures. TIRA’s commitment to visible, impactful actions—such as public service reforms and inclusive governance practices—will be pivotal in fostering trust and reinforcing stability.

By implementing these solutions, TIRA can effectively bridge the governance gap, aligning its actions with the theoretical and practical frameworks of inclusive governance and counteracting the mutating tactics of obstructionist factions. However, this cannot be achieved without sound leadership at all levels.

V. Leadership Appointments and Local Elections as Leverage: The Case of Mekelle

Leadership appointments and local elections represent a strategic opportunity to dismantle extractive networks and restore public trust. Merit-based appointments in Mekelle, Tigray’s political and administrative hub, will demonstrate TIRA’s commitment to reform and set benchmarks for governance throughout the region. While TIRA’s president has the authority to make independent appointments, seeking Cabinet approval can enhance the legitimacy of these decisions, aligning them with the Pretoria Agreement’s principle of inclusivity while minimizing factional incitement. Further, TIRA should actively explore opportunities to hold local elections across various levels of Mekelle’s administration to strengthen public trust and effectively address public resentments.

To secure sustainable governance, TIRA needs to promptly fill key positions with competent, and reform-minded leaders who enjoy wide public support. Failure to act risks creating institutional vacuums, which factions can exploit to deepen cycles of instability. Appointing and getting elected capable leaders in Mekelle would not only stabilize the city but also serve as a model for governance across Tigray, demonstrating that decisions are based on merit and public trust, rather than party loyalty. This approach lays the groundwork for broader policy recommendations that integrate leadership appointments with democratic local elections.

VI. Policy Recommendations: Integrating Appointments with Local Elections

To foster inclusive governance and promote sustainable transformation, TIRA should adopt a dual-track governance model that combines strategic leadership appointments with local elections. This model, once piloted in Mekelle, can be replicated across other cities and woredas, balancing the immediacy and stability of appointments with the legitimacy and accountability of elections.

Operational Considerations:

1. Develop clear criteria for appointments and appoint leaders for all key positions in the region, emphasizing competence, public trust, and reform-oriented leadership. For example, create a Merit-Based Evaluation Framework to assess candidates based on qualifications, experience, and reform alignment.
   Tools include:
   • Competency frameworks (like the UN’s Competency-Based Interview Guide).
   • Stakeholder consultation surveys to gather community input on leadership expectations.
2. Establish timelines for local elections to ensure people elect their leaders at all levels and for an orderly transition from appointed officials to elected representatives where applicable. For instance, develop a phased election schedule for different administrative levels (e.g., Regional, Wereda, City, and District councils).

Tools include:
• Gantt charts to monitor and align election-related tasks with timelines.
• Digital platforms (like Google Calendar) for real-time tracking and coordination.

3. Continuously engage with the public by monitoring grievances and feedback to maintain responsive and adaptive governance. For example, implement public grievance redress systems (e.g., helplines or online portals) to collect feedback on governance issues and elections.

Tools include:
• Community engagement platforms facilitated by independent well-respected institutions, media, and group of professionals to gather insights on public opinion.
• Three-digit or four-digit grievance reporting phone numbers to facilitate direct communication with citizens.
• Town hall or virtual meetings to ensure inclusive discussions.

4. Enforce robust checks and balances to prevent factional obliterations and ensure that security forces uphold the rule of law throughout the electoral and governance processes. For instance, establish an independent oversight committee to monitor governance decisions and election processes.

Tools include:
• Election observation missions from impartial bodies (e.g., local elders, religious leader, civic groups, Universities, and other professional organizations)
• Standard operating procedures (SOPs) for law enforcement to manage security during elections.

Integrating strategic appointments with local elections strengthens TIRA’s governance and lays a foundation for long-term stability. These measures, coupled with continuous oversight, guide Tigray towards resilience and sustainable governance. This leads us to a final reflection on how these strategies collectively shape Tigray’s future.

VII. Conclusion: Bridging the Divide and Securing Tigray’s Future

TIRA must act swiftly and resolutely to bridge the gap between governance efforts and public expectations. Concrete actions including strategic leadership appointments, local elections, inclusive reforms, and transparent governance are essential to ensure lasting stability.

Breaking free from extractive institutions that have long plagued Tigray’s political landscape requires purposeful and timely action. The Pretoria Agreement empowers TIRA with the mandate to lead, but success hinges on its ability to seize fleeting opportunities before they are lost. Thus, TIRA should remain vigilant to all [in]acts of factional obstructions and mitigate them promptly.

As Aristotle argues in Nicomachean Ethics, “excellence is not an act but a habit.” Public service excellence is not achieved by mere intention but through deliberate, repeated actions. Similarly, TIRA’s success will depend not on symbolic gestures but on consistent, well-executed efforts to align governance with the public good. Therefore, guided by a commitment to the well-being of the Tigray people, TIRA must break free from its inertia, recalibrate its course, and take decisive action. Placing the right people in key positions, holding local elections, and establishing the long-overdue Advisory Council are urgent tasks that cannot be deferred.

References

1. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business.
2. Aristotle. (1999). Nicomachean ethics (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Batoche Books. (Original work published ca. 350 B.C.E.)
3. Plato. (2008). The Republic (R. Waterfield, Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original work published ca. 375 B.C.E.)
4. Pretoria Agreement on Peace in Ethiopia. (2022). Available from: Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf
5. Socrates. (n.d.). As quoted in Plato’s works. Retrieved from public domain sources.
6. United Nations. (n.d.). Competency-Based Interview Guide. Retrieved from: Competency-Based Interviews Guide | Thomas.co
7. Zakaria, F. (2024). Age of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash from 1600 to the Present. W. W. Norton & Company.