For lasting peace, TPLF’s monopolization of power in Tigray must end

Mediators must deal with all political actors in Tigray.

Source: Ethiopia Insight

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is commonly assumed to be the sole political actor in Tigray that can negotiate an end to the conflict that broke out in November 2020 between the region and the federal government of Ethiopia, along with its Eritrean and Amhara allies.

This is the case because TPLF has, almost exclusively, dominated the region’s politics since it was founded in 1976.

While it may be pragmatic for outsiders to neglect the other stakeholders in Tigray and push for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to bargain only with TPLF, this approach of conflict resolution is unlikely to bring lasting peace.

Pre-war dominance

TPLF’s opponents in the region identify the party’s intolerant and undemocratic culture as being the main factor that explains its nearly uncontested dominance over Tigray for decades. The party has controlled everything through its entrenched power across all public spheres, including the media, bureaucracy, security, and the judiciary.

The party is notorious for its five-to-one network, where one party member monitors five people in businesses, schools, workplaces, and even households. This system has been the source of TPLF’s control, particularly in rural areas where the state’s reach is less apparent. Establishing this repressive structure has allowed the party to suppress any dissent at the grassroots level.

A split in the TPLF leadership following the 1998-2000 border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the major event that led to the formation of a new opposition party in the region. In the wake of this conflict, disbanded former TPLF elites founded Arena Tigray.

To its credit, Arena made huge strides in becoming an alternative voice in the region. The party’s achievements are limited by the fact that it has never been given space to present itself freely to the public. Members have been ostracized from society and fired from their jobs. Farmers who show support for the party have been evicted from their landholdings.

To make matters worse, members, including party chairman Abraha Desta, have been sent to prison several times. Moreover, TPLF leadership and rank-and-file members have constantly used demonizing terms such as “weed” and “banda’’ (traitor) targeting Arena party. These terms are widely perceived to be a code for the elimination of the opposition party. It is therefore not a coincidence that no significant opposition party or civil society existed until very recently in Tigray.

In 2018, following the sweeping power reshuffle in Ethiopia, a different political environment started to emerge. The new leadership in Addis Abeba proved to be very hostile to the TPLF. Many of the party’s members were either removed from federal offices or faced criminal charges.

For the first time since coming to power in 1991, TPLF faced a critical threat to its survival. The party’s leaders began to take precautionary measures as the newly-formed political alliance under Abiy prepared to eliminate TPLF from power, even in its regional stronghold.

Given this precarious situation, TPLF had no choice but to tolerate various formal and informal opposition meetings that began to take place in the region. These meetings were predominantly focused on achieving greater autonomy for Tigray within the Ethiopian federation.

Many participants started criticizing TPLF’s prior role in the federal and regional governments, as well as its prevailing narratives. This, in turn, led to the formation of three new opposition parties and the emergence of a semi-independent civil society movement in Tigray.

Ascendant nationalism

Since at least 2015, the political environment in Ethiopia has been infested with people blaming Tigrayans for the quagmire the nation finds itself in. This hostile environment resulted in an increasing number of brutal attacks against Tigrayans throughout the country.

These attacks—which have been most pronounced in the Amhara region—and the media’s devastating role in propagating anti-Tigrayan sentiments, precipitated a widespread nationalist response from Tigrayan youth and intellectuals.

By and large, Tigrayan nationalism has been understood as a response to the historical Shewa-Amhara dominance. Accordingly, current nationalism in Tigray is tied to questions of identity and self-rule, including secessionist aspirations which were popular during the armed struggle against the Derg.

Many Tigrayan critics of the TPLF argue that during the armed struggle of the 1970s and 80s, TPLF used nationalism to mobilize the youth against the military junta. However, according to these critics, the party pushed aside ethno-nationalism after it captured state power in 1991.

Amid the power contestation that began in 2018, TPLF once again tried to capitalize on Tigrayan nationalism. In practice, it has failed to cope with the newly formed opposition parties like Salsay Woyane, Tigray Independent Party (TIP), and Baitona Tigray that have become the driving force of nationalism in the region.

Representing the vibrant young generation, the leaders of these opposition parties have been vocal in challenging the TPLF and the federal establishment, while demanding greater autonomy for Tigray and even independence from Ethiopia. Among them, Mehari Yohannes, the founder of TIP, a university professor, and an ardent defender of independence, is at the forefront.

Mehari’s eloquence in explaining the need for Tigrayan nationalism has attracted the attention of the youth. He emphasizes that Ethiopia’s political conundrum is structural, is ingrained in the history of coercive state formation, and reflects the imperial character its leaders continue to pursue. Mehari argues that there exists an irreconcilable clash of state-building visions between those who identify with Ethiopia and those who identify with sub-state identities.

Regional election

In a joint statement issued on 25 June 2020, the opposition parties urged the regional government to hold an election and establish an election commission despite the ruling of the House of Federation that postponed both federal and regional elections due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 

Apparently, there was consensus among the opposition that they would not be able to defeat TPLF in the election. Yet, the rationale for holding the election was based on the belief that it was an essential guard against the threat posed by the federal government. The parties participated in the election because they wanted to use it as a foundation for a stronger Tigrayan nationalism. 

TPLF wanted to hold the regional election primarily to deny legitimacy to the federal government, which it argued had extended its term beyond the period envisaged in the constitution. TPLF was also pushing for national dialogue and negotiations that could ultimately bring it back to the center representing Tigray in a power-sharing arrangement.

To the dismay of the opposition parties, the September 2020 election did not guarantee the newly elected regional government’s legitimacy; it only heightened tensions with the federal government that led to the outbreak of war less than two months later. 

In the war, the entire Tigrayan community has been ruthlessly targeted. The brutality of Eritrea’s involvement, the land grabbing by Amhara in Western Tigray, and the hatred of Tigrayans exhibited by many Ethiopians have all cemented the Tigrayan nationalist ideas propagated by the opposition parties before the start of the war.

Federal occupation

During its occupation of Tigray from November 2020 to late June 2021, the federal government adopted different approaches in dealing with Tigray’s opposition parties.

When it invited Arena to be part of its provisional administration, only a handful of party leaders agreed to join the regional cabinet. This collaboration by a few members subsequently backfired on Arena following the withdrawal of Ethiopia’s army from Mekelle in late June 2021.

By contrast, the federal government treated the three other opposition parties that have a considerable presence in the political landscape of Tigray as TPLF allies, and the National Election Board has so far refused to recognize them as they have participated in what the Board considered to be an “illegal” regional election.