{"id":14337,"date":"2022-05-02T12:21:23","date_gmt":"2022-05-02T12:21:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/?p=14337"},"modified":"2022-05-02T12:21:28","modified_gmt":"2022-05-02T12:21:28","slug":"abiys-botched-centralization-fuels-ethiopias-feuding-centrifugal-forces","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/?p=14337","title":{"rendered":"Abiy\u2019s botched centralization fuels Ethiopia\u2019s feuding centrifugal forces"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The only way forward for Ethiopia is allowing greater autonomy.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Source: Ethiopia Insight<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cindefinite humanitarian truce<\/a>\u201d declared by the federal government on 24 March was welcomed by Ethiopia\u2019s international partners, but led to highly divergent predictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For some, it brought \u201ca glimpse of hope<\/a>\u201c, \u201ca cautious optimism<\/a>\u201d, and is a \u201cfirst step towards a complicated peace<\/a>\u201d, indicating that the time for talks finally seems to be upon us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For others, Addis Abeba\u2019s covert goal is buying time to prepare for new military offensives. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed wanted a \u2018humanitarian truce\u2019 to \u201ccamouflage his military plans. He just recently rearmed. He wants blood,\u201d claimed<\/a> Rashid Abdi, a prominent analyst.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Let\u2019s try to start with the facts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First of all, for four months, the Tigrayans have not gone on the offensive again to try and break the blockade. Two explanations, which are not mutually exclusive, spring to mind: (1) They do not have the military strength to do so, and (2) The Tigrayan leadership continues to hope that the secret talks with Addis Abeba will eventually succeed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to credible diplomatic sources, these discussions expanded to involve Tigrayan and federal military commanders and then, despite denials<\/a> by both sides, at least one extensive phone exchange between Abiy and Debretsion Gebremichael, Tigray\u2019s president.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But only Addis Abeba and Mekelle were reportedly negotiating, without involving or even consulting, other Ethiopian parties\u2014let alone Asmara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The parties set out the terms of a 30-day cessation of hostilities, the specifics of lifting the blockade, the continuation of negotiations to achieve a permanent ceasefire, and, beyond that, an attempt to address Ethiopia\u2019s fundamental political problems. It was agreed that it would be made public simultaneously in Addis Abeba and Mekelle, thus committing both to its terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Suddenly, however, the Ethiopian government unilaterally announced<\/a> on 24 March the \u201cindefinite humanitarian truce\u201d with the purpose to \u201censure the free flow of emergency humanitarian aid to all those in need of assistance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once again, Abiy had reneged on his commitments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A truce is a time-limited suspension of fighting, often for humanitarian reasons. A ceasefire is more formal, commits both sides, and normally opens the path to peace talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By declaring a truce\u2014notably without specifying its geographical scope, the practicalities of its implementation, and any plans to advance the negotiations\u2014Abiy distanced himself from the agreement with Mekelle and released himself from the obligations of a cessation of hostilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conflicting imperatives<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Yilkal Kefale, president of Amhara, which is governed by Abiy\u2019s ruling party, reiterated bellicose statements against the TPLF last month. Two days before the truce, he said<\/a> that the goal was to \u201cconclude the war\u201d and claimed \u201cthe plan to finish it has been concluded and the ENDF is working on it.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In late February, Gedu Andargachew, former Amhara president and Abiy\u2019s national security adviser, said<\/a> that because TPLF\u2019s threatening activity continued, \u201cthe war is not over yet.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the website Tghat<\/a>, Awol Arba, president of the Afar region and a staunch supporter of Abiy, stated<\/a> strong opposition to aid getting into Tigray, due in part to the TDF occupation of parts of Afar.  Thus, it is likely that the Amhara and Afar leaders got wind of the Addis Abeba-Mekelle agreement, leading Abiy to change his plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The prime minister is caught between competing interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, he faces Western pressures, particularly from the US, and the additional risks posed by\u00a0SR.3199<\/a>\u00a0in the Senate and\u00a0H.R.6600<\/a>\u00a0in the House of Representatives. Those bills threaten to cut off funds to Ethiopia, except for humanitarian purposes, and require the US government to defend this position in international financial institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A UK Minister<\/a> recently said that across Ethiopia \u201calmost 30 million are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.\u201d This proportion of vulnerable people is more than double that of a \u2018normal\u2019 year. In addition to the fighting, the drought<\/a> is the worst since 1981. Those in need cannot be helped without massive donor support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite Abiy\u2019s pipe dreams, the economy is collapsing<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Annual food inflation <\/a>is above 40 percent, creating a risk of hunger riots. No improvement in the economic situation is likely without sustained foreign assistance, both public and private, which Western governments typically provide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Signs of mistrust between Abiy and the Amhara elite, a key pillar of his coalition, are multiplying, and so are gaps with Asmara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Last but not least, one should not lose sight of other fronts that Abiy might for now consider even more threatening than Tigray.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main one is Oromia and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), now active around\u00a0Ambo<\/a>, about 100 kilometers from Addis Abeba. If Abiy wanted time to rearm, this is perhaps to intervene there more than in Tigray. The government has launched a campaign to eliminate the \u201cterrorist\u201d group,\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0the national broadcaster on 9 April.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Amid another major ongoing operation against OLA, it is clear that Tigray is no longer the only military front for Addis Abeba. But the destruction of the TPLF<\/a> remains a top priority for the Asmara-Amhara axis, as is the removal of Isaias\u2019 regime for the TPLF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abiy has no option but to try and manage these conflicting imperatives. In this case, if the current balance of power persists, he would modulate the situation daily, keeping Tigray on life-support\u2014but not allowing it to recover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, he would allow enough humanitarian aid to resist pressure from the West, and make sufficient concessions to prevent the TPLF from resorting to a military option, but not concede too much to avoid cutting himself off even more from the Asmara-Amhara axis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In practice, this involves making a few tactical concessions but otherwise continuing the strategy of strangling Tigray via the blockade. This approach is confirmed by the lack of any sign of actual unrestricted aid access to Tigray: less than 150 trucks have reached<\/a> Mekelle more than a month after the \u201chumanitarian truce\u201d, despite TDF now withdrawing from Afar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Economic leverage<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

There are some immediate lessons to be learned from Abiy\u2019s retreat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Roland Kobia, the EU ambassador in Ethiopia, tweeted<\/a> after a meeting with Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonnen that in the face of the \u201ccurrent political situation\u2026 dialogue and engagement are key for better understanding and finding solutions.\u201d In fact, the opposite<\/a> is true: sanctions and the threat to increase them were probably decisive in bringing about this truce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The economic and humanitarian hurdles have become key.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the overall situation continues to worsen, more fiscal pressure on Abiy\u2019s government should get additional concessions, especially on humanitarian aid. But, the prevailing tone from Western diplomats does not seem to be hardening, except perhaps from the US Congress or Samantha Power, USAID\u2019s administrator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During her meeting with Finance Minister Ahmed Shide, Power stressed<\/a> that \u201cmuch more can be done to facilitate significant and sustained humanitarian access to all Ethiopians in need,\u201d without mentioning the need for a total withdrawal of TDF from Afar and Amhara.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The $300-million World Bank grant to the finance ministry,\u00a0appraised<\/a>\u00a0by the European Commission as \u201cpremature\u201d and possibly \u201ccounterproductive\u201d, displays a lack of coordination among the Western powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second lesson is that Abiy has had to postpone, at least for the time being, his plans to bring down the TPLF militarily. He has de facto <\/em>recognized that the party will continue to rule Tigray and that he has no choice but to play the long game by continuing to blockade the region. His ambition to secure his authority over the whole of Ethiopia has been stymied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The final lesson is that Abiy is not totally bound by the Amhara nationalists and their more or less autonomous armed groups. Rashid Abdi predicted<\/a> that \u201cAbiy cannot deliver on truce\u2026 war has already been hijacked by ethnic militias.\u201d Yet, even the Amhara elite had to grudgingly accept the compromise inherent in the truce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What did they get in return? Probably a freer hand over Western Tigray to satisfy their irredentist thirst.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is doubtful that it was only by chance that Getachew Jember, Amhara\u2019s vice-president, led a delegation<\/a> of 600 people in early April from all over the region to visit Welkait-Tegede-Setit-Humera Zone. He said: \u201cWe will work to legalize the territorial and identity issue\u201d of the area. It was the same day that the first aid convoy in three and a half months reached Mekelle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One worthwhile hypothesis is that Amhara nationalists may also have received assurances of stronger engagement against OLA. Amhara elites are increasingly vocal in denouncing the rise of Oromo nationalism, of which they consider OLA the most threatening component.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding conflicts in the Oromo Special Zone in Amhara, one Amhara security official recently said<\/a>: \u201cWe have to speak up and fight before we die.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contradictory information   <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Presently, the information coming out is so biased and contradictory that it has become nearly impossible to decipher the truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For instance, there is no reliable information on the status of military forces\u2014ENDF, TDF, OLA, and so on\u2014such as size, weaponry, and morale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In what appeared to be a leaked audio, General Tsadkan Gebretensae, a member of TDF\u2019s Central Command,  said<\/a> that Abiy\u2019s \u201cmilitary capability is under severe crisis.\u201d According to him, Tigray\u2019s army is now stronger as the youth fighters who reached Debre Sina during last year\u2019s march to the capital \u201chave become soldiers.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, Birhanu Jula, ENDF\u2019s Chief of Staff,\u00a0retorts<\/a>\u00a0that the Tigray forces \u201csuffered huge morale damage\u201d; it is so weakened that it had to \u201chire a lot of mercenaries.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This, of course, is classic wartime propaganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When Tsadkan claims, in the audio, that there is \u201ccommunication on a daily basis\u201d between him, Tadesse Werede\u2014TDF\u2019s top commander\u2014and Birhanu, the ENDF supremo denied it and played on the word \u201cmeet\u201d by declaring that \u201cI didn\u2019t meet with a person called Tsadkan.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Debretsion addressed<\/a> a pressing appeal to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to end the siege and warned that \u201cif peaceful options are no longer viable, we will be forced to resort to other means to break the devastating blockade.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tsadkan, on the other hand, said, \u201cwe don\u2019t expect anything from others [international partners].\u201d He further said that Addis is so weakened militarily, economically, and diplomatically that it would have no choice but to negotiate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fresh settlement<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

We must try to look beneath this froth at deeper currents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Over the longer term, the question is whether this truce marks the first step towards at least an incremental pacification of Ethiopia. This would mean assessing the impact on the country\u2019s fundamental problems and the heart of the crisis, namely, constructing a new way of living together between the country\u2019s 80 or so \u201cnations, nationalities, and peoples.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bigger picture behind this truce is increasingly bleak. Fragmentation is the major dynamic in Ethiopia today. That has led to, among others, the proliferation of local baronies with more or less autonomous control over fairly extensive territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regional state and non-state armed groups are militarizing to assert themselves. According to credible sources, the total of all regional forces plus Fano and equivalents is now double the size of the ENDF, without even counting the kebele<\/em> militias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These centrifugal forces are inseparable from the rise of increasingly fanatical identity-based sentiments, at least among the main \u2018nations\u2019 of Ethiopia. They include a general feeling by multiple communities of being besieged and the victim of genocide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s highly symptomatic and symbolic that one of the strongest unifying links in Ethiopian society, the religions, particularly the Orthodox and Catholic churches, has been tested due to ethnic rifts. More recently, there has also been sectarian violence<\/a> against Muslims in Gonder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These feelings are inseparable from an increasingly pronounced irredentism: almost all kilils<\/em> have territorial claims on other kilils<\/em> that border them. All this leads to a growing conflict in this centrifugal process, marked by the intensification and multiplication of deadly clashes, where armed forces of all kinds confront each other in an increasingly barbaric manner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project assessed<\/a> that \u201cconflict events\u201d increased by 161 percent in 2021. The federal government and almost all regional states have long since lost their monopoly on violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As this indicates, we are dangerously close to a confrontation of all against all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Ezekiel Gebissa, an Oromo academic and activist, the main danger for Ethiopia is no longer balkanization, but what he calls \u201crwandization<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Last but not least, Ethiopia has de facto<\/em> lost large parts of its sovereignty. With the weakening of the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), the Eritrean army is one of the strongest in the Horn, and it occupies parts of Tigray.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Asmara is rumored to have gained a strong position in Ethiopia\u2019s security services. Meanwhile, it is bypassing Addis Abeba to forge increasingly close political and military links with parts of the Amhara elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Eritrea\u2019s long-held strategy towards Ethiopia remains unchanged: to destroy the TPLF and make Tigray its hinterland, while at the same time weakening Ethiopia, whatever the cost, to the point where Isaias can play the puppet master, pulling the strings behind the scenes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Centrifugal forces<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This violent scattering is too far-reaching to expect that what remains of the central power could find the strength to put the country back together.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether we like it or not, the events of the last few years have answered the key conundrum: where can a possible answer to the existential question at the heart of the crisis in Ethiopia be found? It now appears that Ethiopia can only reach some order in a very loose ethnic federation. Fighting this reality would only intensify the centrifugal dynamics to the point of balkanization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tigray is a showcase in this regard. Getachew Reda, who was previously a strong supporter of keeping the region in the federation, had to admit<\/a> that the main popular demand among the Tigrayan public now is independence or \u201cstatehood\u201d, particularly among what he calls \u201cthe resistance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is often said that the so-called Amhara \u2018hegemonists\u2019 or \u2018expansionists\u2019 would be united in their opposition to such a loose federation. But this is only partly true.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, the gap is growing between the most radical Gonder Zone and the more moderate Gojjam, Shewa, and Wello zones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, one must also consider the meteoric rise of Amhara nationalism, the refocusing of the Amhara pan-Ethiopian vision on \u2018Amharawinet\u2019, and its gradual impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Informants in Amhara Shewa, when recently asked about what people around them were thinking, reported more or less the following: \u201cWe thought and acted more like Ethiopian citizens than Amhara. Because of this, we have not been able to come together and organize ourselves, be strong as Amhara, and resist the invasion of the Woyane. Our priority now must be to build a strong Amhara nation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

They added: \u201cLet the Tigrayans do what they want to do at home, trying to go as far as Mekelle is absurd, all we want is to take back our territories that they are occupying.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Desalegn Chane, former president of the National Movement of Amhara, an Amhara nationalist party, was\u00a0asked<\/a>: \u201cIf you had to choose, who would you stand for, Ethiopia or Amhara?\u201d His answer was convoluted: \u201cAmhara can serve as a center and can advocate for the rights of other nationalities while fighting for its own rights as well.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is a far cry from the original goal of de-ethnicizing the federal system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, the fact that Gonder mainly seeks and finds more support in Asmara than in Addis Abeba says a lot about the identity-based withdrawal of parts of the Amhara elite and therefore the strength of the trend towards seeking more autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Abiy has always fought that trend\u2014probably not for any ideological reason, however, but due to opportunism. This trend is the main obstacle to his personal ambition of becoming a true nationwide ruler. His personal position weakens with each passing day, so he maneuvers on a day-to-day basis to try to survive, but with no consistent direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His struggle, paradoxically, accelerates the autonomist trend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The foreseeable failure of the farcical so-called \u201cnational dialogue\u201d and the mass offensive against OLA confirm once more Abiy\u2019s military adventurism. For him, \u201cthere is a military solution to political problems,\u201d despite the disasters that his military adventures led to, said<\/a> Ezekiel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oromo first<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

If we assess Abiy\u2019s record and compare the state of the country today to what it was in April 2018, there is no area of sustained positive development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His Prosperity Party is undermined by divisions, within or between its regional branches. The PP\u2019s general assembly had already demonstrated<\/a> these fractures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unable to map a way out of the crisis, it could only agree on formulations that could be read as everything and its opposite: nation-building must be based<\/a> on \u201ca strong foundation of Ethiopiawinet<\/em> on multinational fraternity\u201d or \u201cnational unity based on multinational federalism.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u2018Oromara<\/em>\u2019 alliance is well and truly dead, as evidenced again by the recent surge of fighting on the Amhara-Oromia border, mainly in the Oromia Zone of the Amhara Region and West Wellega. The war of words between the two sides is also raging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oromia Broadcasting Network, Oromia region\u2019s media, interviewed a West Wellega official who said<\/a>: \u201cAmhara extremists have taken Oromo land by force, to settle on it, and cultivate it.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When a\u00a0Fano chief\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0that \u201cthe main war is yet to start,\u201d he must have this confrontation in mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, there is general disenchantment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Probably the majority of the population no longer supports the war with TPLF. Even the main wing in the diaspora, the \u201cconservatives\u201d who idolized Abiy, turned their back on him, mainly after they were shocked by the release of Sebhat Nega, a TPLF co-founder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some even believe that the war in the north has been launched to weaken the Amhara and bring the Oromo closer to hegemony.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Abiy is still in power, it is mainly thanks to the weakness of his opponents. They are too divided to achieve the weight that their numbers should give them. With no signs that a credible roadmap or a strong opposition leadership will emerge, it is hard to see how Ethiopia can recover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the interim, as long as these opponents consider Abiy useful during this reshaping, they will not really threaten his position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It appears that only the Oromos can be the driving force behind Ethiopia\u2019s recovery, because of their numbers and Oromia\u2019s relatively valuable natural endowment. They are also, above all, the main proponents of the ethnic federalist vision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What appears to be a must is a two-stage construction of a common front that would implement this ethnic federalist project. First, between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), and OLA. Then, this intra-Oromo coalition would need to form a strong alliance with like-minded ethno-nationalist forces from other regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this is a responsibility that the Oromo have historically never managed to assume\u2014and that Abiy will do everything in his power to prevent.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The only way forward for Ethiopia is allowing greater autonomy. Source: Ethiopia Insight The \u201cindefinite humanitarian truce\u201d declared<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14338,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[32,35],"class_list":["post-14337","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article","tag-english","tag-ethiopia-insight"],"featured_image_urls":{"full":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",720,960,false],"thumbnail":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1-150x150.jpg",150,150,true],"medium":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",225,300,false],"medium_large":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",640,853,false],"large":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",640,853,false],"1536x1536":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",720,960,false],"2048x2048":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",720,960,false],"morenews-large":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",431,575,false],"morenews-medium":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1.jpg",308,410,false],"woocommerce_thumbnail":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1-300x300.jpg",300,300,true],"woocommerce_single":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1-600x800.jpg",600,800,true],"woocommerce_gallery_thumbnail":["https:\/\/axumawian.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/05\/1-1-100x100.jpg",100,100,true]},"author_info":{"info":["Axumawian Media"]},"category_info":"Article<\/a>","tag_info":"Article","comment_count":"0","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14337","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=14337"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14337\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14339,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14337\/revisions\/14339"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/14338"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=14337"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=14337"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/axumawian.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=14337"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}